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ACTIONS.

In Parmenter v. Barstow, 43 Atl. 1035, the question was
presented whether or not, in an action of trespass for personal
damages occasioned by negligence, a previous
Judgment
Against Joint judgment against a joint tort feasor for the same
Tort Feasors, injury was a bar to the action.
Estoppel
In deciding that the previous judgment was not
a bar to the action, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island discusses a number of cases which have been decided contra:
Broome v. Wootom, Yel. 67; Adams v. Broughton, And. 18;
Buckland v. Johnson, 15 C. B. 145 ; Rex v. Hoare, 13 M. & W.
495 ; Hunt v. Bates, 7 R. I. 217; Wilkes v. Jackson, 2 Hen.
& M. 355, and Pettico/asv. Richmond, 95 Va. 456. The court
points out that the English cases and Hunt v. Bates, supra,
could have been decided upon the principle anciently applied,
that where property had been taken by a tort feasor and a
judgment in trover recovered against him, the title to the
goods vested in the tort feasor from the date of the conversion, no matter whether the judgment was satisfied or not;
therefore no action could be brought against another tort
feasor, since the plaintiff had no interest in the goods from
the time of the conversion. Of course such a principle could
not possibly be applied to the case of successive actions for
personal injuries brought against joint tort feasors, and so all
the American courts have held, except those of Virginia:
Petticolasv. Richmond, supra. See Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall.
i ; Cooley on Torts, § 137BILLS AND NOTM.

In Colorado a verbal acceptance of a bill of exchange is
binding, even though the drawee has no funds of the drawer
in his hands at the time of the acceptance, proVerbal
Acceptance
vided that he afterwards receives such funds. In
of Bill
the present case the acceptor was estopped from
delaying the receipt of such funds, since, after the acceptance,
634
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he paid to the drawer, on account of the transaction, a sum
greater than the amount of the acceptance: Durkee v.
Coug1ldin, 57 Pac. (Col.) 486.
In Bank v. Fe;guson, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 295, which was an
action by an indorsee of a note against his immediate indorser, the defence was that at the time of the
Parol
indorsement to the holder, plaintiff agreed that,
Evidence
to Vary
in case of non-payment, he would not sue deObligation of fendant until he had realized on certain collateral
Indorser
and had exhausted his remedy against the maker,
in which case he would merely collect the balance from defendant. The Supreme Court of New York, following the
rule in most jurisdictions, held that this was an attempt to
vary the terms of a written contract by parol evidence, which
could not be done in the case of an indorser's contract any
more than any other contract could be varied; therefore the
defence was unavailing. Citing Specht v. Howard, i6 Wall.
564; Brown v. Miley, 20 How. 442; Ins. Co. v. Homer, 9
Metc. 39; Hoare v. Graham, 3 Camp. 57; Free v. Hawkins,
8 Taunt. 92; Abrey v. Crux, L. R. 5 C. P. 37.
Salomon v. State Bank, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 407, offers a valuable hint as to a manner in which a number of small suits
Plaintiff had reConversion may be rendered unnecessary.
of Checks by ceived twenty-four checks for small amounts,
Bank
drawn to, his order, which were stolen and deposited in the defendant bank, plaintiff's name being forged.
Defendant collected the checks and paid the amount to the
depositor, and plaintiff brought an action of tort against
defendant for the conversion of the checks and recovered
their full amount. In this way plaintiff escaped the trouble
of bringing twenty-four suits for small amounts against the
makers of the checks, many of whom were non-residents,
and by sounding his action in tort, he relieved himself from
the rules governing actions on negotiablt instruments, such
as liability to deliver the checks to defendant, subrogation, etc.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A statute of Kansas, Gen. Stat. 1897, c. 134, §§ II,
provided that upon the conviction of prisoners bePower to Free tween the ages of sixteen and twenty-five and
Convicted
their sentence to terms in the state penitentiary,
Prisoners,
they should be removed to a state reformatory
Pardon
and detained for the length of their sentence or
20,
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released to liberty at the discretion of the managers of
-the institution. The Supreme Court of Kansas decided
(i) "that the power given to the managers did not encroach on the power of the legislature to punish for crime,
since the legislature fixed the punishment, but merely made
it conditional, and (2) that it did not encroach on the governor's pardoning prerogative, because the managers only
gave the prisoners their liberty and did not pardon in the
legal sense of the word, i. e., remove the existence of their
guilt in the eye of the law: State v. Page, 57 Pac. 514.
The Supreme Court of Utah has affirmed a conviction for
felony, where the trial took place before eight jurors instead
Due Process of twelve, in accordance with Art. I, § io, of the
new constitution of Utah and Rev. Stat. (1898),
of Law,
Trial by
§ 1295, which provided the procedure for the new
Eight Jurors form of trial.
The constitutional provision was
attacked as being in violation of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States, providing, respectively, for the continuance of the jury trial and
for the protection of citizens of the United States against
deprivation by the states of life and liberty without due process of law. In respect to the fourteenth amendment, the
court shows, by a steady line of decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States from Hurtado v. California, I IO
U. S. 5 16, to Hodgson v. Vermont, i68 U. S. 262, that there
is nothing in this amendment which requires that the jury of
twelve shall be preserved forever; while, as to the sixth
amendment, the court was obliged to repeat the old and wellworn proposition, that the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States do not constitute restraints on
state action. . Although the Supreme Court of the United
States has consistently adhered to this doctrine ever since the
time of Chief Justice Marshall, yet lawyers never seem to
grow tired arguing the question, since, to our knowledge, the
point has been raised four times in appellate courts within the
last few months: In Re Maawell, 57 Pac. 412.
CONTRACTS.

An interesting decision has been rendered in regard to the
proper interpretation of the provisions of the California Code
to contracts in restraint of trade, which
Restraint of in regard
egr toc
Trade, Sale of provisions may be regarded as typical of the
Ooodwill by various codes which are in force, or about to be
Stockholder adopted, in several states.
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The Civil Code, § 1673, prohibits. all contracts in restraint
of trade, except as allowed by the next two succeeding sections. § 1674 provides that th vendor of the goodwill of
a business may bind himself to refrain from carrying on the
business within a specified city or county, so long as the
business shall be carried on by the vendee. § 1675 provides
that a retiring partner may do the same.
In Mlferchants' Avtg. Co. v. Sterling, 57 Pac. 468, the general
manager of a corporation, who was a large stockholder, sold
his stock to the plaintiff, stipulating that he would not engage
in the business within the county as long as it should be carried on by the plaintiff. In a bill for an injunction to restrain
the vendor from breaking the agreement, the question was
whether or not the vendor of the stock was a "vendor of the
goodwill of the business," within § 1674. It was strongly
urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendant was such
a vendor, because the value of the goodwill of the business
entered into and' formed an element in the value of the stock;
that plaintiff would not have paid so much for his stock if he
had not obtained defendant's stipulation to refrain from the
business. However, the Supreme Court of California decided
that it must adhere to the strict letter of the code; that the
goodwill of a corporation is an attribute of the corporation
itself, and not of the stock thereof; that only the corporation,
and not a stockholder, can be a "vendor of the goodwill" of
its business, within § 1674; therefore, even though an enhanced price had been paid for the stock on the strength of
the stipulation, yet that defendant could not possibly be a
"vendor" within § 1674, but defendant's stipulation not to
engage in business was void under § 1673. The decision,
while technically correct, is very unfortunate, since it is directly
in the teeth of modern tendencies, both legal and economic,
which seek to legalize these contracts in partial restraint of
trade when they are bonafide, founded on a valuable consideration, and are necessary for the legitimate protection of the
vendee.
CORPORATIONS.

In M1ay v. Genesee County Bank, 79 N. W. 630, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided that under a statute of that
Assessments, state exempting any but the real owner of stock
Registered from assessments on account thereof, a bank which
Owner
was registered on the books of a corporation -as
the owner of the stock, might show that it was, in fact, the
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pledgee thereof. The facts were that a person gave the stock
in question to a bank as collateral security by executing an
assignment on the back of the stock certificate. Subsequently
the vice-president of the bank requested the corporation to
cancel the old certificate and issue a new one in the name of
the bank as pledgee. He was informed that it would do as
well to have the stock stand simply in the name of the bank
without adding the word pledgee, and he consented to have
the certificate issued in that form. Subsequently the corporation failed and the receiver sued the bank for the assessment
due on the stock held by it. It appeared that the bank in its
corporate capacity had never ordered the certificate taken out
in its name and proof was offered that the stock had never
been held as anything but collateral security for debt. The
court held that the bank might show that it was only a pledgee
and not liable to the assessment. This interpretation of a
statute which provides that .apledgee shall not be liable for
assessments, seems to be in accord with the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Burgess v. Seligman,
107 U. S. 31, and Pauly v. Trnst Company, 165 U. S. 6o6.
It seems, however, that where there is no such statute, the
person in whose name the stock stands is liable for the assessments: See Altman's Appeal, 98 Pa. 505.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has
recently rendered an interesting decision on the construction
Foreign
of the New Jersey Act of 1896 (P. L 1896, p 307,
Corporation, § 97, et seq.), which provides that no foreign corTransaction poration shall do business in New Jersey until it
of Business
Without Corn- files a certificate of incorporation with the secrepliance with tary of state and in other ways complies with the
Statute
statute. The D. & H. Canal Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, sold coal to a person in New Jersey and
obtained a guaranty for the payment of the price from defendant, who resided in Jersey City. In an action on the contract
of guaranty, defendant pleaded that plaintiff was attempting to
"do business" in New Jersey without having complied with
the above statute.
The court decided that the object of the statute was to
prevent foreign corporations from transacting a general business, in New Jersey and that it had no application to a single
act of business, such as a sale or a contract of guaranty, as in
this case, citing with approval Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S.
727; Thompson, Corp., § 7936. As the court said, if this
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single transaction came within the term "doing business" in
the above statute, then it would also come within the statute
which requires fines, taxes and license fees from foreign corporations "doing business in the state," and it would be unreasonable to subject the corporation to the burden of the statute on
account of a single act. Judgment for the plaintiff was therefore affirmed: D. & H. Canal Co. v. Brock, 43 AtI. 978.
In .the same volume of the reporter there appears a decision
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to the same effect,
holding that a corporation of Illinois, which sends an agent
into Pennsylvania to effect a single sale of a machine, does not
violate the Pennsylvania Act of April 22, 1874 (P. L. IO8),
relative to terms upon which foreign corporations may "do.
business" in Pennsylvania: Wolff Dryer Co. v. Bigler, 43 AtI.
1092.

In Topeka Capital Co. v. Remington Paper Co., 57 Pac.
(Kas.) 5o4, an action was brought against the defendant corporation on a note signed: "The Topeka Capital
Off irs
Recognition Company, Dell Keiser, B. Mgr." The defendant's
by Courts. answer set forth the fact that there was no such
"Business
officer in a corporation as a "business manager"
Manager" known to the law, and that plaintiff had not
averred that any authority had been given to the said business
manager to make the note. On demurrer to the answer, the
court ordered judgment for defendant on the ground that only
the statutory officers of a corporation are presumed to have
power to perform corporate acts; that the" business manager"
was not such an officer; that, while everyone knows that the
business manager of a corporation commonly does have the
power to transact such business, yet that the court could not
take judicial notice of the fact; and that it was necessary for
the plaintiff to aver and prove that power to make the note
had been conferred by the directors upon the business
manager.
DEEDS AND MORTGAGES.

Where the acknowledgment of a mortgage by a married
woman is regular on its face, it requires very strong evidence
Gray
Acknowledg. to establish the fact that it is void. Thus, in.
ment,
v. Law, 57 Pac. 435, a suit brought, to cancel a
Evidence to mortgage by a married woman on the ground
Establish
that it had not been acknowledged apart from her
Invalidity husband, plaintiff rested his case on the evidence
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of the husband and wife, who testified that the wife had
signed the acknowledgment in her own house and before her
husband, who then took the mortgage to the notary, where
the acknowledgment was filled in and completed. However,
the testimony of the husband was so very contradictory that
it was thrown out altogether, and the Supreme Court of
Idaho held that the unsupported testimony of the wife was
insufficient to rebut the strong presumption of regularity
arising from the face of the acknowledgment.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

It is well settled in New York that when an elevated railroad is constructed along the streets of a city, only those
property owners can recover damages whose
Separate
Buildings properties front on the street where the road is
Under One
located: Mooney v. R. R., 9 N. Y. Suppl. 522.
Roof,
But it we
will easilv be seen that a difficult question
Damages
arises when a railroad is built in front
of a large
apartment house which has stores opening upon both
the front and rear streets. Is the damage to be confined to
that portion of the building which fronts on the road, or is the
general damage to the whole building to be taken into consideration ? The Supreme Court of New York says that if, as
in Reilly v. Manhattan Rwy. Co., 59 N. Y. Suppl. 335, the
stores in the rear of the building are separate and distinct from
the stores in the front, the damages must be confined to the
latter, and evidence of the depreciation in value of the rear
stores is inadmissible.
EVIDENCE.

In M1usser v. Stauffer, 43 Atl. i 8, an action was brought
on promissory notes, the defence to which was that the notes
were given on the strength of a contemporaneous
Proof of
Foreign Law, parol agreement, the performance of which was a
Reports of
condition precedent to the payment of the notes,
Decisions
and which agreement had not been performed by
the plaintiff. The notes were made and payable in Virginia.
A previous action had been brought on these same notes and
carried to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (178 Pa. ioo),
where the case had been decided according to the law of
Pennsylvania, in favor of the plaintiff, there being no evidence
that the law of Virgina was different.
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In the present case, at the trial in-the court -below, counsel
furnished decisions of the highest court of Virginia, appearing
in the authenticated reports of such decisions, showing that,
according to the law of Virginia, a contemporaneous parol
agreement afforded no defence to an action on a written contract, and the lower court decided the case in accordance with
these decisions, on the familar principle that the law of the
place of performance of a contract governs the performance.
On appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended that the law
of Virginia on the subject had not been sufficiently proved,
but it was held that the reported decisions, being unanswered,
constituted a sufficient rebuttal of the presumption that the
law of the forum was the same as the law of -the contract
This point, although argued by counsel and decided -by the
court, is not noted in the syllabus of the case in the Atlantic
Reporter.
In Knowlton v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 44 Atl. (Conn.) 8,
Baldwin, J., said, "The Superior Court had the right to take
judicial notice of the historic fact that the railroad
Judicial
Notice,

Opening
of Railroad

between New Haven and New York was opened
by January 1, 1849. The opening of a new rail-

road for public use is one of those events of public

notoriety which are to be taken as known by the courts,
because they are known to everybody. It is a great geogrhphical change, like the bursting out of a new river from the
earth, to serve as a highway of commerce in new directions."

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Unlike the rule in Maine and a few other jurisdictions, it is
settled in New York that a woman who entices a husband
Alienation of away from his wife is liable to an action by the
Husband's wife: Bennett v. Bennett, I I6 N. Y. 584; Jaynes
Affections
v. Jaynes, 39 Hun, 40; Baker v. Baker, 16 Abb.
N. C. 293. The Supreme Court of New York has extended
this doctrine a trifle further in Kuhn v. Hemmann, 59 N. Y.
Suppl. 343, where it was held that the parents of the girl with
whom the married man had gone to live must respond in
damages to the wife, when it was shown that they had
assented to and encouraged the adulterous intercourse between
the married man and their daughter, had furnished the pair
with money and apartments in which to live, and had been
present at a bigamous marriage which took place between
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Van Brunt and
their daughter and plaintiff's husbanid.
Ingraham, JJ., dissented, but the grounds of their dissent are
not stated.
INJUNCTIONS.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska in a very unsatisfactory
opinion (Miskell v. Prakap, 79 N. W. 552) has decided that
Trade-Name, where a plaintiff has built up a business, which has
linfringement become well known by the name or designation of
the " Racket Store," and the defendant then opens a store
close by, which he styles the "New York Racket Store," the
words "New York" being printed in very small letters, there
has been no infringement of the plaintiff's rights. The evidence in the case tended to show that the use of the word
"racket" was very common in the district for the designation
of such stores as those of the plaintiff and defendant. The
court must have based its decision on this ground alone. It
says, "In some cases it has been decided that such designations are but descriptive in their character, and subsequent
similar use by a near rival will not be enjoined at the instance
of one who had made the prior selection and application."
See Cray v. Koch, 2 Mich. N. P. 119; Choynski v. Cohen, 39
Cal. 501.
INSURANCE.

In Cummins v. German, etc., Ins. Co., 43 Atl. ioi6, one of
the questions at issue was whether or not the proof of loss
Proof of Loss. furnished by the insured sufficiently complied with
Sufficiency, the policy to warrant the bringing of the suit.
Question for The trial judge sent the proof to the jury for
their determination of this question.
Court
An appeal by the defendant, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that the iction of the trial judge was error,
since the only point at issue was one which could be determined from an examination and comparison of the proof and
the policy, and this was clearly a question of law for the court
and not one of fact,-following Ins. Co. v. O'Neill, I Io Pa. 548 ;
Cole v. Assurance Co., 188 Pa. 345, and Sutton v. Ins. Co., 188
Pa. 38o. Judgment for the plaintiff was therefore reversed.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Aliadara v. Shamokin, etc., Rwy. Co., 43 Ati. 995, plaintiff proved that she was a passenger in an electric car of the
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defendant company; that the car became stalled
by reason of some defect in the motor; that one
Employment V., who was on the car, assisted in attempting t6
from Acts of get it started and gave directions to the conductor
Servant
and motorman; that V., finding his efforts were
unavailing, said that he would go back to the car barn and
bring out a new car, which he did; and that in negligently
operating the new car he ran it into the other one, where
plaintiff was sitting, whereby she was injured.
The tial judge refused defendant's request for binding instructions, but left it to the jury to determine whether V. acted
as a mere volunteer or whether he acted as an agent of the
company by virtue of the authority or instructions of the.
motorman. On an appeal by defendant, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania was even 'more unfavorable to defendant's
case than the trial judge, as appears by the following language:
"Being injured by one of the carrier's cars while occupying
that relation, the*presumption is that it was through the negligence of the carrier. The burden is on it to rebut the presumption by showing that V was a mere intruder upon the
relieving cai, acting wholly without authority. The burden
is not upon the passenger to prove that one apparently in
authority, having access to the car barn and the power to
assume control of a cir, and run it on the road to the relief
of the stalled car, was a servant of the company. If the
accident had apparently been caused by the act of a stranger
while the plaintiff was a passenger, as in Railway Co. v.
Gibson, 96 Pa. 83-a collision with a hay wagon-the burden
would have been on her to show negligence on part of defendant. But when it arose from a collision between defendant's cars, operated on its own rails, the presumption of negligence arises, and the burden is on the defendant to rebut it."
Presumption

of

MECHANICS' LIENS.

The third clause of the printed contract between the owner
and the contractor provided that the owner could require of
the contractor sufficient evidence that the premises
Release of
Liens,
were free from all liens before payment could be
Repugnancy demanded, and that he could retain an amount
In Contract sufficient to indemnify him against
any liens
which might be filed without regard to the contract. The
tenth clause of the contract, which was written in ink, provided that "no liens shall be filed by any sub-contractors or
any other persons for or on account of work, etc."
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In dismissing the lien filed by the contractor himself, the
Supreme Court held (I) that the tenth clause contained all
the requirements necessary to bring it within Schroeder v.
Galland, 134 Pa. 277, and barred the contractor himself
from filing a lien, and (2) that if any repugnancy existed between the third and tenth clauses of the contract, the tenth
clause must prevail, in accordance with the rule stated in
Grandin v. Insurance CO., 107 Pa. 26, that " where the written
and printed portions are repugnant to each other, the printed
form must yield to the deliberate written intention :" Comm.
T7ust Co. v. Ellis, 43 Atl. 1034.
NEGLIGENCE.

In Brague v. Vort/z Cent. Rwy., 43 Atl. 987, which was an
action to recover damages from a railroad company for the
Trespasser o death of a child, it was shown that the deceased
Railroad,
was about seven years old; that the railroad had
Child,
given him permission to get water at a spring beLicense rom longing to the company, across the track from

the place he resided; that he
had filled his pail
with water and was walking across the track, not at the public
crossing a short distance from the spring, but directly from
the spring to his house; and that he was struck by an engine
and killed while crossing, or walking along the track.
In affirming a judgment for defendant, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania decided that (i) the license from the company
gave the deceased simply the right to take the water from the
spring, which could be obtained by crossing the track at the
public crossing, and no permission to otherwise trespass on
the track could be implied, and (2) the rule that a railroad
owes to a trespasser only the duty of abstaining from wanton
negligence applies even where the trespasser is a child, as in
this case. In support of the last proposition, R. R. v. Hummdll,
44 Pa. 375, Moore v. R. R., 99 Pa. 301, and Cauley v. R. R.,
95 Pa. 398 were cited.
PERPETUITIES.

Property was devised to A. for life, and after his death to a
corporation, which the testator directed his executors to form
under the laws of New York within the lifetimes
Devise to
Corporation of B. and C.

to be Created

in futuro

The devise being attacked on the

ground that the remainder to the corporation violated the rule against perpetuities, it was held,
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that the remainder was valid, since it was necessary for the
corporation to be formed within lives in being, i. e., the lives
of B. and C. The mere fact that there might be a hiatus
between the death of A. and the creation of the corporation
did not affect the question, since the property would revert to
the heirs of the testator, subject to being divested by the creation of the corporation within the lives of B. and C..: 7essup v.
Pringle emorialHome, 59 N. Y. Suppl. (Supreme Court), 207.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

When an agent has been appointed, and subsequently the
principal becomes insane, the agency is revoked as regards all
persons except those who deal with the agent in
Insanityof
Principal,
ignorance of the insanity of the principal: But
Revocation of when one of these latter persons attempts to hold
Agency
the principal on a contract made by the agent
subsequent to the insanity of the principal, it is well for him to
remember that as soon as the insanity of the principal has
been proved, a pimafacie case in favor of the defendant has
been made out, and the burden is then on the plaintiff to
show that he dealt with the agent in entire ignorance of the
fact that the principal was insane: .Aferitt v. Merritt,59 N. Y.
Suppi. 357.
REAL PROPERTY.

A. and B., adjoining owners, executed a party wall agreement providing for the building of the wall and stipulating
Party Wali that if it should ever be in need of repairs, the exAgreement, penses should be borne by both parties, and it was
Incumbrance stipulated that the covenant should run with both
on Title
properties. A. having agreed to convey his lot,
the question was whether the title was clear or whether the
party wall agreement formed an incumbrance. Held, that it
constituted an incumbrance on the property, since at any time
the owner might be forced to contribute with his neighbor for
the repair of the wall: Corn v. Bass, 59 N. Y. Suppl.
(Supreme Court) 315.
The question whether or not rent abates when a portion of
the leased premises are taken under the power of eminent
Abatement of domain has been touched upon by the Supreme
Rent where Court of Pennsylvania, though no binding position
Portion of
has been taken by the court as yet. U/ter v.
Leased Prem.
Ises are Taken Cowan, 44 Atl. 42, was an action against the
by Eminent tenant for rent for the quarter from Jan. I, to
Domain
April 1, 1897. The'affidavit of defence admitted
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the liability for rent up to Jan. 26, I8§7, but averred that on
Oct. 26, 1896, the City of Philadelphia gave plaintiff notice that
three months after that date a portion of the leased premises
would be taken for a public wharf; that plaintiff gave defendant notice of the city's intention; and that on Jan. 26, 1897,
defendant surrendered that portion of the premises to the city.
The lower court gave judgment to the plaintiff for want of a
sufficient affidavit of defence, and defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The latter reversed the judgment of the court below, but
the opinion of Justice McCollum distinctly states that this is
not to be regarded as a final adjudication of the general question involved, but that the court wishes to postpone its
decision until it has before it a record which presents the facts
more clearly than those given in the statement of claim and
the affidavit of defence. However, in commenting upon the
question involved, the court, says that notwithstanding, the
contrary decisions of other states, such as Stubbings v. Evanston, 136 Ill. 37, yet it sees no reason why it should not apply
to the case of the partial taking of the rented*premises the
rule laid down by Justice .Sharswood, in Dyer v. Weigttman,
66 Pa. 425, namely, that where the whole of the demised
premises are taken, the rent abates. The court cites with
approval Mills, Em. Dom., § 69, Lewis, Em. Dom., 483, and
an interesting article upon the subject by Joseph H. Taulane,
Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar, 29 Am. Law Rev. 351.
TRIAL.

A motion for a new trial in an action against a city for
injuries received by reason of a defective sidewalk was made
improper upon affidavit of one B., who deposed that during
Conduct of the progress of the trial he had seen A., one of the
Jury,
jurors, together with other persons, who, he was
New Trial,
Evidence
informed, were other members of the jury, visiting the scene of the accident and measuring off the ground.
A. filed an affidavit denying B.'s allegations. The Supreme
Court of New York refused to disturb an order denying a new
trial, since, even if the conduct of the jury had been to the
prejudice of the petitioner, the fact that the single affidavit
charging it was denied, justified the trial judge in refusing the
new trial: Haight v. Elmira, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 193.
TRUSTS.

In St Peter's Church v. Brown, 43 AtI. (Rhode Island) 642,
a bequest in trust to a church, to use and apply the income
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Chaities

therefrom for church purposes, was upheld, and a

trustee appointed to administer the trust, though

such church, at the time of the death of the testator and at the
time of the probate of the will, was not an incorporated body.
See Cocks v. Manners, L. R. 12 Eq. 574.
It requires very strong evidence to establish the fact that a
trustee has repudiated the trust and claimed the property as his
Disavowal of own, so that statute of limitations will run in his
Relationship favor against the cestui que trust. In In re
by Trustee McCormick, 59 N. Y. Suppl. 374, the Surrogate's
Court of New York did not think that such a disavowal of the
trust had been established by the fact that for twenty years
the trustee had characterized his payments to the beneficiary
as gifts from himself to the beneficiary.
WATERS.

An action was brought against a city, in which the complaint stated that the city had raised the grade of the street in
Raise of Grade front of plaintiff's property, and that by reason of
such change of grade the natural flow of surface
of Street,
Prevention of and other waters from plaintiff's lot was impeded
Surface Water and the waters flowed back into plaintiff's dwelllow
ing. The plaintiff seemed to have based his claim
on the idea that the street was a sort of a servient tenement,
under the civil law rule that where two properties adjoin, the
owner of the lower one may not raise the level of his land so
as to obstruct the natural flow of surface water from the upper.
The Supreme Court of California very properly held, that,
however this doctrine might apply to lands situate in the
country, the rule in cities was different where both streets and
lots may be improved without any thought of what becomes
of the surface water from the neighboring properties: Lampe
v. San Francisco, 57 Pac. 461.
In Baumgartnerv. Sturgeon River Boom'Co., 79 N. W. 566,
the Supreme Court of Michigan has reiterated its ruling in
Booming Co. v. Jarn, 30 Mich. 308, that no
Waters,
Damges,
matter how necessary it maybe for the preservaPlcading tion of logs to catch them at a certain boom, if in
so doing the owner of the boom backs up water on the land
of riparian owners he is liable at all events. The question of
negligence is unimportant. In the present case a demurrer to
a statement which failed to aver negligence on the part of the
boom company was overruled.

648

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

WILLS.

A testator gave his son the income 6f $6ooo, for life, thereafter it was to be held and enjoyed by the son's widow, if he
should leave one, while she remained such. After
Vested
Re-inder

his son's death and the death or marriage of his.

widow, he bequeathed said $6ooo to his son's children and to
the legal representatives of such of them as might be dead,
to be divided equally between them, giving to the legal representatives of any deceased child the same share to which said
deceased child, if living, would be entitled. The son died
leaving one child who died before her mother. Held, that
the child took a vested remainder on the testators death, and
that on her death the mother inherited the $6ooo: Thyng v.
Lane, 43 Atl. (N. H.) 616.

